We have presented some algebraic (n, n)-threshold schemes in [3] . In this paper we proposed the algebraic (n, n)-secret image sharing schemes.
Introduction
Secret sharing schemes were examined by Shamir in 1979 [10] . Shamir's scheme is a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme and this scheme was based on polynomial interpolation. A (t, n)-secret sharing scheme is a method of distribution of information among n participants such that t > 1 can reconstruct the secret but t − 1 can not.
In a secret sharing scheme there are participants and a dealer. The dealer has a secret and distributes it to the other participants. In a minimal t-subset of participants recover the secret while combining their shares.These subsets are called the minimal access sets. The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of all minimal access sets.
Another secret sharing scheme is the multi-secret sharing scheme. This scheme was proposed [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [13] , [4] . In the multi-secret sharing scheme [8] , [9] , [2] there is a set of p secrets can be shared at once and each participant needs to keep one share is called secret share. In this scheme all p secrets are recovered at once or all p secrets can not reconstruct. To recover the secrets the participants need to submit a pseudo − share computed from their secret share instead of the secret share itself.
In a (t, n)-secret image sharing scheme, the secret image is used to generate n image shares (shadows) as follows.
• the secret image can be recovered by combining any t image shares (t ≤ n)
• the secret image can not be recovered by combining any t − 1 or fewer image shares.
Thien and Lin [11] proposed a new lossless (t, n)-secret image sharing scheme based on Shamir's secret sharing in 2002. Then Li Bai [2] proposed an image secret sharing scheme combining matrix projection and Shamir's secret sharing schemes. Wang and Su [12] proposed a secret image sharing method using Huffman coding.
In this work we propose a new (n, n)-secret image sharing scheme. In fact we generalise the results of [3] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the basic preliminaries used in the paper. Section III presents the proposed scheme. Section IV explains its analysis and discussions and the last section concludes the paper.
Background and Preliminaries
In this section we give the basic preliminaries and some necessary mathematical information used in this work.
Representation of elements of finite fields
It is known that there are three different ways to represent the elements of a finite field F q with q = p n elements, where p is the characteristic of F q . One of them is given by means of matrices.
The companion matrix of a monic polynomial
of positive degree n over a field is defined to be n × n matrix
It is clear that A satisfies the equation f (A) = 0. This means
where I is the n × n identity matrix. So, if A is the companion matrix of a monic irreducible polynomial over F p of degree n, then f (A) = 0. Hence A can play the role of a root of f [7] .
(t, n) Multi-secret image sharing schemes
A (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme has the following properties.
• there is a set of p secrets can be shared at once,
• participants only need to pool their pseudo−shares instead of disclosing their secret shares when recovering secret images,
• each participant can share many secret images by holding only one secret share [1] .
Image secret sharing
An image I is defined by c number of colors and d × l pixels m i,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, which form a matrix M with coefficients in Z c such that if I is a black and white image, then M is an d × l matrix, where m i,j = 1 if the corresponding pixel is black and m i,j = 0 if the corresponding pixel is white,
The scheme
In this section we present an (n, n)-secret image sharing scheme that combines of (n, n)-threshold scheme.
Proposed method
Assume the finite field F 2 d be the secret image space and f be an irreducible polynomial of degree d in
. We construct a secret image sharing scheme based on this ring. Let be N = 2 d . The secret image share dealing protocol as follows.
1) The dealer picks s elements e i amongst N at random such that N > s > 1,
2) the secret image is S = 
Secret image distribution
We know that the elements of F
Secret image reconstruction
Since the finite field F 2 d is zero-sum set, then the sum of all elements of F 2 d is zero, but without smaller size zero-sum sets. It is clear that the entries of matrices will be 0 or 1. If it is 1, then the corresponding pixel is black and if it is 0, then the corresponding pixel is white.
The black and white pictures are transmitted and by using the properties of zero-sum sets the colour picture is reconstructed. That is the secret image can recover in this way.
Let f denote a polynomial of degre d in Z 2 [x] and consider the finite field So the set of elements of F 2 3 is
where I is the 3 × 3 identity matrix. We write these elements explicitly. 
Now, we construct a secret images sharing scheme based on F 2 3 . It is clear that in this scheme with s = 2
• there are 2 3 − 2 = 6 image shares,
• 2 elements whose sum is the secret image s,
• each element has 3 × 3 = 9 pseudo − share images. So, the secret image has also 9 pseudo − share images.
Let A 5 = A + A 2 be the secret image and it is distributed to the other participants. Then N − s = 2 3 − 2 = 6 participants can recover the secret by combining their image shares. Now, we explain how the secret image reconstruct can. Since for the entry 1 the corresponding pixel is black and for the entry 0 the corresponding pixel is white, then every element of F 2 3 can be represented as follows.
Since the finite field F 2 3 is zero-sum set, then the sum all of nonzero images must be zero.
In the left side of equation if it is written the images of these elements, then it is obtained
It is easily seen that this scheme is also a (6, 6)-secret image sharing scheme.
Analysis and Discussions

Security analysis
We discuss the security of the proposed (2 d − s, 2 d − s)-secret image sharing method is as folllows. Since the public values are the elements of F 2 d is zerosum set, then the sum of all elements is zero, but without smaller size zero-sum sets. Every public value has d × d pseudo − share images. However none of the public values can be determined using pseudo − share images by himself. All of nonzero public values while combining their image shares can recover the secret image. So this scheme is very reliable.
Performance analysis
The size of each image share does not depend on the size of the secret image in the proposed secret image sharing method. This is an important property for the another process of the image shares. Each participant only needs to hold one secret share in order to secret image can share. The proposed scheme does not generate shadow images which are difficult to identify.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a new algebraic (n, n)-secret image sharing scheme using the results the work [3] . It is realized by combining the finite field F 2 d and the algebraic (n, n)-threshold scheme. Each participant can be represented as a matrix and only needs to hold one secret share in order to the secret image can share. Morever, the proposed scheme does not generate shadow images which are difficult to identify. The scheme is also effective, secure, reliable and suitable for network applications.
In the current research we are explaining the method for the general access structure.
